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I don’t usually write about environmental law (or, for that matter, about policy in general)—and I’m not about to pretend I’m an expert in it now. But the permitting bill that the Senate is trying to rush to President Trump’s desk before the new Congress is sworn in on January 3 raises questions closer to this newsletter’s wheelhouse, including what Congress can do to the power of the federal courts and how much effectively unreviewable authority it can and should hand to the executive branch.
To make a long story shorter, the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act (BAAJA) pairs long-overdue reforms to how we plan and build electric transmission with provisions that would sharply limit the role courts can play in reviewing unlawful environmental decisions—and that would make this administration’s specific permitting choices very difficult for its successors to undo. It has reached the Senate floor without a single hearing, markup, or committee report, yet it may pass as early as Wednesday (after a procedural vote later today).
As I explain in this week’s “Long Read,” although the bill is complicated, my view is pretty simple: BAAJA’s good parts are reason enough to get the rest of it right; its bad parts should worry you whatever your views on environmental policy; and a rushed, lame-duck vote after a decidedly bereft legislative process is a lousy way to decide whether the pros outweigh the cons. Whatever the right answers are, they demand far more deliberation than they’ve received so far—and at this late date, only the next Congress can provide it.
Much more on all of that below. But first, the more Supreme Court-specific news.
On the Docket
The Merits Docket
Last Monday’s regular Order List was pretty quiet—with no new grants of certiorari and no separate writing. Instead, the only additions to the merits docket once again came on Friday—when the Court added two cases to the lineup for the current term (bringing the current total to 36). One of those two cases—Mullin v. Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services (RAICES)—is a massively important case about the Trump administration’s effort to foreclose asylum to anyone who entered the United States by crossing the southern border without permission, even though a series of statutes (to say nothing of the United States’ obligations under international law) arguably require the government to provide access to asylum claims even to those who enter the country surreptitiously. The administration argues that (1) the federal courts can’t even hear the lawsuit challenging that policy; and that, in any event, (2) the policy is lawful on the merits. The lower courts disagreed, and the justices agreed to take up most of the government’s appeal.1
Between RAICES, the third-country removal case (D.V.D.), and the mandatory-detention-without-bond case (Barbosa da Cunha), it seems safe to say that the three biggest cases of the term, at least as of now, are all major immigration cases—all of which are likely to sort the justices along ideological lines.
The Emergency Docket
Last week also produced two rulings on emergency applications. On Monday, the Court granted the Trump administration’s application in Mullin v. Friends of the Ruidosa Church, allowing the government to continue building a border wall along part of the Texas-Mexico border that includes Big Bend National Park. Once again, the Court wrote a majority opinion explaining its ruling—the 10th grant of emergency relief (out of 14!) since this summer that has been accompanied by a formal opinion of the Court. The evidence of a conscious shift on the Court’s part toward providing these kinds of explanations continues to mount. And as I suggested previously, the merits here actually do favor the Trump administration; I just don’t think the balance of the equities supported intervention now. Suffice it to say, the majority’s equities analysis is … light, which may be why Justice Jackson publicly dissented, albeit without opinion.
The only other ruling out of the Court last week was Thursday’s denial of a stay of execution to Oklahoma death-row inmate James Pavatt. As usual, there were no noted dissents.
The Week Ahead
Turning to this week, we expect a regular Order List at 9:30 ET, although the fact that the Court handed down grants on Friday (presumably because it’s still behind in filling out the February and March argument calendars) may mean we don’t get any new ones today. The justices are not scheduled to take the bench again until two weeks from today (when the “December” argument session begins), and nothing else is expected from the Court before then.
Miscellaneous
Finally, I wanted to flag Tuesday’s publication of the Harvard Law Review’s annual Supreme Court issue—including my Foreword on the Supreme Court’s deteriorating relationship with the lower federal courts. I wrote here about the Foreword when I posted a draft earlier this year, but it’s really neat to see the final version in print—and I’m grateful to a heck of a lot of people for helping to get it there, as I noted on Bluesky.2
The One First “Long Read”: BAAJA’s Bad Juju
Before diving in, I should note that I’m on the Board of Trustees of Earthjustice, the nation’s largest non-profit environmental law organization. Earthjustice obviously has an interest in BAAJA’s fate, but what follows reflects my views alone—and, with my apologies in advance for the length and level of detail, is a bit … wonkier … than usual.
Background
BAAJA was introduced on September 30, just before the Senate left town for the midterms. The transmission title is the bill’s bright spot, but it takes up only about 94 of the introduced bill’s 417 pages (plus some mixed material on geothermal and other energy permitting). Most of the rest of the bill rewrites the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)—sometimes to speed up pipelines and other projects, and sometimes just to deregulate. There’s also a new “project certainty” title (designed to make it harder for already-approved projects to be cancelled solely because political tides in Washington have changed), and the Manager’s Amendment (about which more in a moment) adds a nuclear energy title, as well.
To put all of this into context, let’s start with NEPA—the 1970 statute that requires federal agencies to study and disclose the environmental effects of major projects that they build, fund, or approve. NEPA doesn’t dictate outcomes; an agency can approve a project with real environmental costs so long as it has taken an honest look at them. But just about everyone agrees that these reviews have often taken far too long, and that finished reviews could be unwound years later. That’s the problem BAAJA’s sponsors say they’re solving, and it’s a legitimate one. But many of the familiar horror stories predate Obama- and Biden-era reforms like the (rarely used) FAST-41 fast-track process, and the Supreme Court’s May 2025 decision in Seven County already blunted NEPA as a tool for blocking projects. What NEPA still does well is force agencies to show their work—and slow down the most egregious actions, like the ICE detention center I’ll come back to below.
On Saturday, November 7, BAAJA’s sponsors released a 494-page substitute, introduced as a “Manager’s Amendment” to the original bill. Their announcement described it as “clarifying, conforming, and technical edits.” As I explain below, some of the changes are a lot more than that. But to see why the substitute is itself such a mess, it helps to start with BAAJA’s broader context—the good, the bad, and the ugly.
What’s (Probably) Good About BAAJA
The best case for BAAJA is its transmission title, and, in my view, the affirmative case is a serious one. The United States currently cannot move enough electricity from where it’s generated to where it’s needed. The bill would strengthen FERC’s “backstop” authority to approve interstate lines when states won’t act, without first requiring the Energy Department to designate a national-interest corridor. It would also require regional and interregional planning, set cost-allocation rules, codify FERC’s recent long-term planning rule, end incumbent utilities’ first dibs on new regional lines, push technologies that squeeze more capacity out of existing wires, speed up grid-connection studies for new power plants, and make data centers pay for the transmission they use. All of this is designed to make it easier to build new lines and expand existing ones.
Environmental groups overwhelmingly like this part. The Natural Resources Defense Council calls the grid reforms the bill’s principal strength, and that appears to be a common view—although, with very few exceptions, those same groups say the rest of the bill needs work before they can support it. Senator Whitehouse (one of the original sponsors) goes further, calling BAAJA potentially the biggest climate bill ever actually implemented. And support for the transmission provisions crosses party lines—in part because gas-fired plants need new transmission lines, too.
Whether BAAJA is a great climate bill on its own is less clear; many of its boosters now argue less that it will cut emissions than that it lays a foundation for other climate policies. Others doubt the transmission reforms are as transformative as billed, since federal law already lets FERC override state siting decisions. But that authority applies only to lines in corridors the Energy Department has designated, which is the very prerequisite BAAJA would eliminate. How big a deal this shift actually would be is one of those things that hearings, expert testimony, and committee reports could, you know, suss out. Ditto the value of the project-certainty title, versus the costs of preventing future presidents from undoing the bad policy choices of their predecessors.
What’s (Definitely) Bad About BAAJA
Many non-specialists are surprised to learn that NEPA doesn’t itself authorize anyone to sue. Challengers instead usually go to court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). They generally have six years to file, and a court that finds a violation has a range of remedies, including vacatur, which voids the approval altogether. BAAJA would change almost all of that.
Under the bill, as the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and others summarize it, challengers would have 150 days to sue. If there was a public comment period, they’d need to have filed a detailed comment raising the same issue, and they’d have to show “direct harm.” Their cases would skip the district courts and go straight to the courts of appeals, which would be told to give “substantial deference” to the agency on the scope and content of its review. Those are significant new constraints on judicial review of administrative action.
But the biggest change here is to the potential remedies. A court that finds a NEPA violation could only send the decision back to the agency to fix it within 180 days, and the project could proceed under its permit in the meantime. A court could pause a project only if it were likely violating some other law (besides NEPA and the NHPA). In its May 2025 ruling in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, the Court held (with Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson concurring only in the judgment) that a flawed environmental review doesn’t automatically require undoing a project. But BAAJA would take that option off the table entirely. And the bill doesn’t say what happens if the agency’s second try is no better than its first. Thus, NEPA and the NHPA would become largely toothless—at least on their own.
The bill’s defenders have a ready answer: Challengers can still sue under the APA, so not much changes. But former D.C. Circuit Judge David Tatel, who regularly heard these kinds of cases while serving on the court of appeals, did not find that claim persuasive—as he explained in a piece for Bloomberg Law last week. As Judge Tatel put it, every “NEPA lawsuit” is really an APA lawsuit. So when BAAJA says that, “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” remand is “the only remedy” for a NEPA violation, that language has to cover APA suits; otherwise it would do nothing, and courts try hard not to read statutes that way. It’s also a settled principle of statutory interpretation that specific, newer provisions will control general, older ones. Put simply, Judge Tatel expects judges to read the bill to mean exactly what it says—that there’s no real relief for standalone NEPA or NHPA violations, whether “under the APA” or otherwise.
The other fallback—that the Clean Water Act or the Endangered Species Act will catch the truly dangerous projects—fares no better. As Judge Tatel notes, plenty of cases have turned on NEPA alone. Judge Reyes has relied on NEPA to block the administration from continuing to demolish the East Potomac Golf Course (including in her most recent ruling from Saturday night); earlier this year, a federal judge in Maryland blocked the conversion of a warehouse into an ICE detention center on NEPA grounds; and other examples abound. But Judge Tatel (rightly, in my view) doubts that these results could be repeated under BAAJA. The fallback argument also misunderstands how NEPA works. Historically, NEPA has often served as a “discovery” statute: The various reviews NEPA requires have a tendency to unearth otherwise unnoticed violations (or potential violations) of other laws, such as harm to an endangered species. But if there’s no real incentive for careful NEPA reviews, more of those violations will go unnoticed until after the real-world harm has occurred, by which point they’ll be much harder to remedy.
Because I view these kinds of policy disputes mostly through the lens of the courts’ role, what jumps out at me is how one-sided all of the judicial review reforms are. There are new provisions to fast-track review for developers who think an agency is dragging its feet, and disputes between agencies would go to the chair of the White House Council on Environmental Quality, whose decisions no court could review. And the project-certainty title would create a new kind of lawsuit for permit holders—in which, as CRS explains, the government would bear the burden of proof, and a winning plaintiff could recover between 25 and 50 percent of its project costs from the Judgment Fund. One provision would even steer some of these cases back to the judge who had previously blocked a stop-work order on the project.
In short, under my read of the Manager’s Amendment, those who claim the government violated environmental laws would get fewer and weaker remedies, while those who claim the government got in their way by imposing environmental regulations would get more and stronger ones—and, in some cases, their pick of judge. As I’ve suggested before, Congress has broad power over the remedies federal courts can award. But choices like these should be made deliberately, and explained on the record—especially at a moment when lawsuits have been one of the few effective checks on executive overreach. Unless the only executive overreach you’re worried about involves presidents who take our environmental laws seriously, this bill seems to have things entirely backwards.
BAAJA’s Ugly Parts: Limiting Review and Entrenching Prior and Current Actions
Relatedly, several parts of the bill would let the executive branch approve projects with less scrutiny. The original version exempted federal loans, loan guarantees, and many grants from both NEPA and historic-preservation review; the Manager’s Amendment narrows that exemption only for some transportation financing. Under these provisions, the reviewing agency could also discard any alternatives that don’t meet the developer’s own goals; it could ignore research published after a review begins even when that research calls into question the premises of the agency’s proposed action; and it could decide for itself that complying with some other law makes NEPA review unnecessary. And interstate gas pipelines would be declared not to be “major federal actions” at all—a carve-out that would also exempt those specific types of projects from a host of additional procedural requirements.
The Clean Water Act changes have drawn less public attention (at least outside environmental and state attorney general offices). Under current section 401 of that statute, a state can block or condition a federal permit for a project that would discharge into its waters. According to CRS, BAAJA would narrow what states may consider in those reviews and create special rules for interstate pipelines and transmission lines; on my read, a state could deny certification only with “clear and convincing evidence” that no condition would fix the problem. The bill would also double the maximum term of water-pollution discharge permits—from five years to ten. The Environmental Council of the States sent Congress a letter explaining in much more detail than I can muster here why these and similar provisions could be deeply problematic if adopted.
Then there’s Section 1401, the heart of the project-certainty title. CRS describes it as a general bar on revoking, suspending, or altering federal permits in effect on or after a cutoff date. In the bill as introduced, that date was September 16, 2026—two weeks before the bill was even filed. The Manager’s Amendment moved it to November 6, 2026. Section 1401 would also bar any agency action that interferes with a fully permitted project’s “operation at full capacity.” The exceptions are narrow, encompassing court orders, permit violations, fraud, certain urgent threats based on new information, and requests from the permit holder itself. Critically, none of the exceptions would cover a new administration that concludes its predecessor issued a permit unlawfully. And the court-order exception is less useful than it looks—because the federal government can’t sue itself. In a nutshell, in trying to assure companies that what they do under one administration won’t be undone by the next, the bill may well shield plenty of unlawful actions, too.
And “locking in” a permit means more than it might sound. Even some Senate offices deep in this bill have assumed that a future administration could just shorten a permit’s term. It couldn’t. Section 1401 reaches not only outright revocation, but any new action that would suspend, reopen, “materially amend,” or “materially alter” a covered permit. So the current administration would get a little over two years to approve projects under looser rules, and its successors would be largely stuck with the results—until and unless those decisions are blocked in court, which other parts of BAAJA, as noted above, already make a heavier lift.
That one-way certainty is what worries some Democrats. On October 27, Senators Tammy Duckworth, Ed Markey, Jeff Merkley, and Ron Wyden wrote to the sponsors that “the promise of BAAJA will only succeed if President Trump takes care that it is faithfully executed.” The echo of the Take Care Clause is deliberate, and it captures a point that ought to be especially obvious right now: A statute is only as good as the executive branch’s willingness to carry it out in a principled, neutral manner. And it’s a little difficult to have much faith in such faithful execution at the moment.
The “Manager’s Amendment”
A few of the Manager’s Amendment’s changes respond to critics. For instance, it tightens the provision letting developers sue over “disparate treatment” of their type of project. And it pulls transportation projects receiving more than $10 million from the Transportation Department back into NEPA and NHPA review.
The historic-preservation fixes, in contrast, have been oversold. The Manager’s Amendment drops several provisions that would have cut Native American tribes out of these processes altogether. But it would require agencies only to “seek, discuss, as appropriate, and incorporate, as applicable, information” from tribes and tribal groups while preparing the required report. In other words, the tribes are still in the room, but the government doesn’t have to listen to them.
Meanwhile, BAAJA’s other problems for tribes largely survived into the late-breaking amendment. Federal officials would still have nearly unfettered discretion, with little or no input from tribes, to decide what triggers the required review, what counts as an “adverse effect,” and how much mitigation is enough. Tribes would still face compressed timelines and new scrutiny of their internal operations that could cost them programs and grants—and they would lose effective court remedies for protecting culturally important places even as developers gain aggressive new deadline suits. With or without the Manager’s Amendment, BAAJA does no favors for tribal sovereignty or the federal government’s trust responsibility.
On the grid side, the Manager’s Amendment drops a provision that would have let the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) review large transmission lines while states were still reviewing them, and it confines the new planning requirements to regions with organized grid operators—leaving out most of the Southeast. Whether that’s on purpose or by accident is … hard to say, again, because all of this has been so rushed.
The Manager’s Amendment also adds a new title on nuclear fuel-cycle licensing (Title V, Sections 1501–04) that would, among other things, authorize construction of uranium enrichment facilities while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s already-weakened licensing process is still underway, and let some projects proceed without a public hearing. Note, again, the theme: there may be good arguments for these changes as a matter of policy, but there are also arguments against them, and there just hasn’t been a meaningful opportunity for the arguments on either side to be aired.
Big changes in a manager’s amendment aren’t unusual. Releasing them on a Saturday ahead of a Monday vote is. Several policy shops in D.C. that analyze these bills on a regular basis publicly explained that they couldn’t work through the new text in that window, and I doubt most Senate offices did, either. Indeed, part of the problem is that there’s too much in the bill to cover quickly.
The Lame-Duck Rush
S. 5653 was referred to the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, which never acted on it: there was no hearing, no markup, and no committee report. Instead, the Manager’s Amendment is basically a rider to a different bill—H.R. 2347, the Survivor Justice Tax Prevention Act, which the House passed in April, and which is ostensibly about the tax treatment of damages paid to survivors of sexual abuse. (The Manager’s Amendment keeps those tax provisions as “Division C.”) Tacking BAAJA onto an already-passed House bill was a transparent procedural ploy to allow it to skip committee consideration entirely. That’s pretty significant, since it’s not clear the bill would have gotten out of committee in its current (or amended) form.
To be clear, BAAJA isn’t a reconciliation bill, and it isn’t evading the filibuster. The November 9 cloture vote needed 60 votes; it got 73, and the Senate agreed to the motion to proceed the next day, 62–21. So there’s a real majority to at least vote up or down on the bill. But what the process has skipped is regular order. That weekend release gave the country’s 575 federally recognized tribes and the deeply interested states, environmental groups, and other lobbies roughly two days to react before cloture. And according to the Congressional Record, Majority Leader Thune has filed for cloture on the Manager’s Amendment substitute, with a vote originally set for last Friday and now expected later today. Without amendments, final passage in the Senate could come as early as Wednesday evening—after which the bill would go back to the House (which could potentially vote to approve whatever the Senate passes, thus sending it to President Trump’s desk).
There are certainly times when committee hearings and formal reports can have the feel of box-checking. But they often do real work. Hearings are where senators who didn’t write a bill learn what it does from their colleagues, from witnesses, and from other concerned parties—and where the people the legislation affects get to weigh in. Committee reports are where Congress explains what unclear provisions mean and why particular reforms were (and were not) adopted. If BAAJA has lots of anything, it’s ambiguity. CRS notes that Section 1401 doesn’t define “action,” “project,” or “operation at full capacity,” and warns that courts could read the provision in deeply conflicting ways. With no legislative history, judges will settle those questions case by case, quite possibly differently in different circuits. It’s bad enough that we’re left with this kind of litigation landscape for old statutes; it would be really dumb to deliberately create it for a brand-new one.
Finally, just to say the quiet part out loud, all of this is happening after an election in which Democrats won control of both chambers (the new members set to take office on January 3). There’s nothing inherently problematic about legislating during lame-duck sessions of Congress, and Congress has long used them to finish work already underway. But one of the reasons why the Twentieth Amendment moved the start of each new Congress to early January was to shrink the window in which a departing majority could keep acting after the voters had spoken—all the more so when control of both chambers is flipping in the interim. A 494-page rewrite of the country’s permitting laws is a lot more than simply unfinished business.
To be fair to the case for hurrying, the broader deal reflected in BAAJA took more than a year of hard bipartisan bargaining, and it might not survive starting over in the new Congress. Lame ducks have also historically been freer to act without worrying about the next election. But neither of those arguments is actually responsive to the larger question—i.e., whether BAAJA is ready. If the transmission reforms are as popular across the aisle as everyone says, they should still be popular in February—after we’ve had a chance to meaningfully discuss and debate whether the rest of the bill’s many significant changes are worth the costs they at least seem poised to impose.
***
Plenty of people who know environmental law far better than I do disagree about BAAJA’s tradeoffs, and I don’t claim to have a particularly educated view about who’s right. But you don’t need to resolve that debate to be troubled by how this process is unfolding. Here we have a bill that would reshape the remedies available across a major category of federal litigation. It would create new damages claims payable from a permanent, unlimited appropriation; loosen review of executive decisions now while making many of them hard to revisit later; narrow the states’ role in protecting their own waters; and change how the federal government consults with Native American tribes on some of the most important subjects of their ongoing dialogue. Each of those reforms should be enough to justify its own hearing. Meanwhile, BAAJA has had none; it was rewritten over a weekend; and it’s moving through Congress as an amendment tacked onto an unrelated tax bill.
Ultimately, if the best parts of BAAJA are as good as their champions say (and I think many of them may well be), they should survive the wait. But before anyone casts a final vote, folks ought to know what the rest of the bill actually does—and the public ought to have a real chance to weigh in. That shouldn’t be controversial. Then again, it’s 2026.
SCOTUS Trivia: Lame-Duck Confirmations Before a Shift in Senate Control
Speaking of lame ducks, even though I think the odds of a new Supreme Court nomination during the lame-duck session are going down by the day (and started pretty low), I was curious about the precedents for a justice being confirmed by a lame-duck Senate when (1) they were nominated after the election results were known; and (2) control of the Senate switched parties as a result of the election. There’s one very well-known example—the Federalist-controlled Senate’s January 1801 confirmation of John Marshall to be Chief Justice, just over one month before the Democratic-Republicans took control of both chambers of Congress and the White House. But it turns out, there have been four other examples since—although none since 1893 (and so none under the much-compressed lame-duck timeline created by the Twentieth Amendment).
In 1841, Peter Daniel was nominated by President Martin Van Buren and confirmed by a lame-duck, Democratic-controlled Senate two days before control of the Senate passed to the Whigs. Four years later, Samuel Nelson was nominated by President John Tyler and confirmed by a lame-duck, Whig-controlled Senate two weeks before control of the Senate passed back to the Democrats. In 1880, William Woods was nominated by President Rutherford B. Hayes and confirmed by a lame-duck, Democratic-controlled Senate before control of the Senate shifted (albeit messily) in March 1881. And in 1893, Howell Jackson was nominated by President Benjamin Harrison and confirmed by a Republican-controlled, lame-duck Senate two weeks before control passed to the Democrats.
Interestingly, in all four examples, the nominating president was also a lame duck. In other words, there are no examples of a successful confirmation of a Supreme Court justice in circumstances resembling today’s—i.e., in the lame-duck session after a midterm election in which the President’s party clearly lost (or even clearly won) control of the Senate.3 And the only time there was even a nomination in those circumstances (President Eisenhower’s November 1954 nomination of John Marshall Harlan II), it was the new, Democratic-controlled Senate that eventually confirmed the nominee, not the lame-duck, Republican-controlled one.
There’s always a first time for everything, but I think this one will have to wait.
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We’ll be back with our regular bonus post on Thursday. Until then, I hope you all have a good week—especially Members of Congress who vote to slow BAAJA down.
The Solicitor General had also asked the Court to review the validity of the class of plaintiffs that the district court certified in this case, but the Court did not grant certiorari on that question.
The Foreword is also the subject of my one public event this week—a lunchtime event at Harvard Law School on Thursday with Professor Alan Raul.
Without going too far into the weeds, I’m not counting the 1835 confirmation of Justice James Wayne during the lame-duck session after the 1834 midterms—because it wasn’t clear then (and wouldn’t be for some time) whether partisan control of the Senate was going to shift in the new Congress.



I think the practical problem with "pushing pause on BAAJA" is that in this context there is really no difference between "pause" and "never."